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ELECTIONS, POWER, AND LOCAL CONTROL: 
REINING IN CHIEF PROSECUTORS AND SHERIFFS  
 
 
Janet C. Hoeffel

 
Stephen I. Singer 
Our problem of mass incarceration, and perhaps more 
importantly, the barriers to changing it is, at least in significant part, 
tied to the manner in which key actors in our criminal justice system 
are selected in relation to other political actors.  More specifically, 
there are two problems with the election of local chief prosecutors and 
sheriffs that contribute to the problem of mass incarceration and act as 
a barrier to reform.  First, prosecutors and sheriffs have an extremely 
narrow, single-minded focus – crime control and suppression.  Second, 
unlike other elected government officials with much broader 
responsibility–such as mayors, city councilmembers, governors, and 
state legislators–local chief prosecutors and sheriffs are not term 
limited and often run unopposed. Chief prosecutors and sheriffs 
frequently remain in office for an entire generation or more.  This 
toxic combination of narrow focus and disproportionate power skews 
our political system in the direction that secures and increases the 
power of chief prosecutors and sheriffs.  And the primary thing that 
this does, either directly or indirectly, is mass incarceration.  In this 
paper, we argue that the historical goals causing the move from 
appointed chief prosecutors and sheriffs to elected ones have not been 
realized because of these distortions.  In fact, because times and 
government have changed, these goals are now better realized and 
managed by moving back to a system of appointments, allowing 
citizens to retain local control over criminal justice through more 
responsive and balanced elected local officials. 
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I.   THE HISTORICAL REASONS FOR ELECTING PROSECUTORS AND 
SHERIFFS 
The states’ primary impetuses for the move from appointed 
chief prosecutors and sheriffs to elected ones was the desire for more 
local input and control and for increased democratization of American 
government by giving citizens input through elections of officials.
1
  
During this period, citizens became dissatisfied with a remote central 
state government appointing local officials such as prosecutors and 
sheriffs, which often resulted in appointments simply being the spoils 
of electoral victory at the state level, i.e., a patronage system.
2
   
In addition, the appointment of state officials to run local 
governments was inevitable for the vast majority of the country.  By 
far, the most well developed governmental structures existed at the 
level of state government.  Most of the country lived in rural areas and 
small towns with local governments that were fairly rudimentary in 
their development.  Therefore, except for perhaps in the few large 
cities, the only real option for the vast majority of the country was 
appointment by state level officials who did not come from the area 
nor represent their local interests.  Therefore, when the citizenry 
became dissatisfied with the patronage system that had developed over 
the appointment of local officials such as judges and chief prosecutors, 
it was inevitable that it turned to local elections.  Because government 
at the local level was, as a general matter, rudimentary and 
inconsistent, the natural solution, really the only option, was local 
elections.
3
 
                                                          
1
 Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528 
(2012).  As described by Michael Ellis, it is no coincidence that this change came at 
the same time when American government became more democratic. Id. at 1530. 
State constitutional conventions adopted measures to “enlarge voting franchises, 
reapportion legislatures, and make many more government offices, including 
governors and judges, elected.”  Id. 
2
 Id. 
3
 Today, local chief prosecutors are elected in all states but five. See Ronald F. 
Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 598 (2014) [hereinafter 
Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections].  In Alaska, Connecticut, Rhode Island, 
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II.   THE SINGULAR INSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE ELECTED 
PROSECUTOR AND SHERIFF 
 
The quintessential elected officials are the chief of the 
executive branch and the legislative branch.  At the local level this 
usually means a mayor and city council or their equivalent.  Mayors 
and city councils are typically responsible for providing a broad array 
of services to the local citizenry.  These services include police, 
firefighters, streets, water, lighting, other utilities, sanitation, parking, 
health, housing, and parks and recreation.  Because of this wide range 
of responsibilities, a mayor and city council cannot put too much 
money into any one area.  Rather, a mayor and city council must 
develop a ranking of services in order of priority and allocate limited 
resources accordingly.  Moreover, the relative ranking of various 
services must correlate fairly well with that of the local citizens or the 
elected officials risk being voted out of office.   
Local chief prosecutors and sheriffs, however, do not have this 
breadth of responsibility.  They are law enforcement officials with a 
singular responsibility–crime suppression and control.  Their job 
performance, to the extent it is evaluated at all, is based solely on how 
local citizens feel they are doing in terms of dealing with one issue–
crime.  Therefore, for the chief prosecutor and sheriff, the more money 
spent prosecuting crime and punishing criminals the better.  Unlike the 
mayor or city council, they do not need to weigh the costs and benefits 
of prosecuting and punishing crime against any other community 
needs such as streets, water, lighting, sanitation, housing, health, or 
parks and recreation.  
Another weight on the scales of power is the vested interests 
their offices garner.  Local prosecutors’ and sheriffs’ offices function 
much like any other government bureaucracy.  The bigger they get and 
the more resources they command, the more powerful they are and the 
                                                                                                                                         
Delaware and New Jersey, a statewide elected official appoints the local chief 
prosecutors.  Id. at 598–99. 
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better positioned they are to command more and more resources.  For 
example, the bigger the office, the more people it employs.  The more 
employees the office has, the more voters it touches through the 
employee, the employee’s family and friends, and their families and 
friends.  In addition, and this is particularly true of sheriffs running 
local jails, the bigger the jail or the office, the larger the contracts the 
office has to give out.  These valuable contracts for food, laundry, 
plumbing, electrical, and the like further create vested interests that 
seek to protect and enlarge the status quo.
4
   
One might believe that a mayor has vastly more of this kind of 
power than a mere sheriff or district attorney given the broad array of 
responsibilities and the multitude of employees and facilities under his 
or her purview.  But such is not the case.  Most city employees, 
beyond the mayor’s and city councilmembers’ personal staffs, are 
covered by civil service rules that bar political activities and protect 
against political retaliation.  Many of the larger departments such as 
police, fire, and sanitation may be staffed by union workers protected 
by collective bargaining arrangements.  Further, local government 
contracts are usually covered by competitive bidding rules and 
regulations that greatly limit discretionary authority. 
On the other hand, the same is often not true for sheriffs’ and 
particularly prosecutors’ offices.  In many places, especially in the 
South where incarceration rates are higher, employees of these offices 
are exempted from civil service.  This means that they are “at will” 
employees who may be hired and fired for any reason or no reason at 
all.  This also means that not only are employees and their families and 
friends a direct source of votes, but they may provide labor for the 
campaigns of the head of the office for whom they work and for 
                                                          
4
 A study by the Vera Institute of Justice showed that 74% of a typical jail’s costs is 
employee costs, such as for benefits and health care, and the number of employees 
is, of course, driven by the number of inmates and the size of the jail.  VERA 
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF JAILS:  MEASURING THE TAXPAYER COST OF 
LOCAL INCARCERATION 10 (2015), 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/price-of-jails.pdf.  
Sheriffs have every incentive to grow the size of their population and their facilities. 
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political allies or future allies of the sheriff or chief prosecutor.  Once 
again, bigger is definitely better.   
And while some of the same may be said for the bureaucracy 
under a mayor and city council, even if not to quite the same extent 
due to civil service rules, because the broad array of responsibilities 
conspires to limit their power.  Thus, while a health department creates 
a vested interest in resources going to the health department, this is 
balanced by competition from the sanitation department, the fire 
department, and the police department, etc.  The same is not true for 
prosecutors’ and sheriffs’ offices with their narrow, single-minded 
focus on crime.  All of the pressure is in the same one direction – 
towards more and more resources for prosecution and punishment of 
crime. 
 
III.  THE ELECTORAL FORCES CREATING INTERMINABLE POSITIONS OF 
POWER 
 
The election process itself utterly fails to ensure local control 
by the citizenry.  Control remains firmly in the hands of the chief 
prosecutor and sheriff.  Voters have very little to do or say about 
prosecutors’ and sheriffs’ elections.  Unlike sitting mayors, governors, 
and state and local legislators, the vast majority of incumbent 
prosecutors and sheriffs run unopposed.
5
  The unopposed chief local 
prosecutor and sheriff need offer little, if any, information or 
accountability to voters during an election.  Additionally, regardless of 
whether he is opposed or unopposed, the incumbent prosecutor and 
                                                          
5
 To ensure they retain this unchecked power over the criminal justice system, chief 
prosecutors have their own war chests, and to remain ingratiated with this all-
powerful dispenser of mercy and favors, lawyers contribute heavily to the incumbent 
to ensure they will be treated well by the District Attorney. See Jeff Morganteen, 
“The DA Who’s Staying Put With the Help of Generous Donors,” (Sept. 12,2013), 
http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2013/09/12/vance/. There are many examples, but 
Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance provides one ready example of the excess. 
After Robert Morgenthau retired at age 89, having served for nearly 35 years in the 
position, Vance was elected in 2009. Id.  In order to ensure his victory in 2013, he 
began an aggressive fundraising campaign; his campaign treasury held a $1.6 million 
balance as of July 2013. Id.  Of course, no opponent emerged.    
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sheriff wins the vast majority of the time.
6
  And, even when there is 
opposition, the voters neither hear nor demand more than statements 
about personal experience and character or platitudes indicating the 
candidate is “tough on crime.”  Voters neither hear about nor demand 
information about the incumbent prosecutor’s office policies, whether 
on plea bargaining or charging, or about the cost to the taxpayer of 
overcharging and mass incarceration of arrestees and nonviolent 
offenders.
7
 
To distort the process further, unlike sitting mayors, governors, 
and state and local legislators, incumbent prosecutors and sheriffs do 
not have term limits.
8
  Although term limits never garnered sufficient 
support to become law at the federal level, a veritable wave of term 
                                                          
6
 In Ronald Wright’s study of ten states between 1996 and 2006, he found that sitting 
prosecutors won 71% of the general elections. Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor 
Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 592 (2009) [hereinafter Wright, How 
Prosecutor Elections Fail Us]. “Because the incumbent sought reelection in only 
75% of all general election campaigns, the incumbent success rate when running for 
office was 95%.” Id.  Even more striking is the lack of opposition at election time. 
Over 80% of prosecutor incumbents run unopposed in both general elections and 
primaries. Id. at 596 Table 2. Contrast that with state legislative incumbents, who 
run unopposed in only 35% of their elections. Id. at 594. 
7
 “Prosecutor elections fail for two reasons: (1) they do not often force an incumbent 
to give any public explanation at all for the priorities and practices of the office and 
(2) even when incumbents do face challenges, candidates talk more about particular 
past cases than about the larger patterns and values reflected in local criminal 
justice.”  Id., at 583. 
8
 As of 2004, one state, Colorado, does have term limits for chief prosecutors, who 
can serve no more than two consecutive four-year terms. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor 
Elections, supra note 3, at 602 n.37. “As a result, the percentage of re-election races 
run by incumbents is 51%, is much lower than the normal 74%.” Id. at 602. One 
benefit of turnover that could also affect incarceration rates is diversity. Brooklyn 
District Attorney Charles J. Hynes was finally defeated in 2013 after twenty-four 
years in office. Hynes was defeated by Kenneth Thompson, a former federal 
prosecutor, who became the first African-American district attorney in Brooklyn’s 
history. This is no small matter as a recent study showed that about 95 percent of the 
2,437 elected state and local prosecutors across the country in 2014 were white, and 
79 percent were white men.
 
Nicholas Fandos, A Study Documents the Paucity of 
Black Elected Prosecutors:  Zero in Most States, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/07/us/a-study-documents-the-paucity-of-black-
elected-prosecutors-zero-in-most-
states.html?emc=edit_th_20150707&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=55122800. 
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limits legislation swept through the states, especially in the South.
9
  
The term limits wave, however, was focused on state legislators and 
eventually state executives, and never made its way down to sheriffs 
and chief prosecutors.
10
  As a result, a single chief prosecutor is able to 
stay in office for decades – for an entire generation – without 
challengers, and without anyone questioning the policies that cause 
more convictions, the Sheriff to call for larger jails, and a bloated and 
outsized bureaucracy to hold the machinery together.
11
  Taxpayers foot 
the bill and have no idea what it is.
12 
                                                          
9
 Since the 1980’s, when the war on drugs combined with the crack epidemic to 
create a tidal wave of “tough on crime” legislation, at the same time there was a 
wave of “term limits” legislation that spread throughout the country.  Term limits 
were initially conceived by Republicans to solve what might now be regarded as a 
quaint problem – as a way to finally break the stranglehold on the federal Congress 
that Democrats had enjoyed since the New Deal in the 1930’s. 
10
 To the extent the issue has been or would ever be put to voters, they would seem 
to support term limits.  In 1994, Colorado voters passed a constitutional amendment 
expanding term limits to all but judges, and including District Attorneys.  In 2002, 
the state’s District Attorneys sponsored a referendum to exempt DAs from term 
limits, but it lost by 65 to 35 percent margin.  The issue was finally settled in 2004 
when the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that inclusion of District Attorneys term 
limits followed the intent of the voters.  In 2001, Nassau County residents voted in 
favor of a referendum that no district attorney could serve longer that 12 consecutive 
years in office.  Unfortunately, the referendum was invalidated by the court, which 
held that only the state, and not voters, could determine how long district attorneys, 
who were state officials, could remain in office.  
11
 Using New York City as an example, chief prosecutors can fully expect to stay in 
power for decades without opposition if they want. Until Brooklyn District Attorney 
Charles Hynes was defeated in a contested election in 2013, after 24 years in office, 
1955 was the last year an incumbent district attorney in New York City had been 
beaten by an opponent. In Brooklyn, the last time an incumbent prosecutor was 
voted out was in 1911. Richard Brown in Queens has been in office since 1991. 
Robert Johnson in the Bronx has been the borough’s top prosecutor since 1989. 
Robert Morgenthau served as Manhattan district attorney for nearly 35 years before 
retiring at age 89. As another example, Harry Connick, Sr. presided as Orleans 
Parish District Attorney from 1973 to 2002. Over the course of his career, “he 
lobbied against almost any policy that could be perceived as a sign of prosecutorial 
‘softness,’ even plea bargaining.” Gwen Filosa, Connick calling it quits, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Mar. 23, 2002; see also Gwen Filosa, Harry Bids Adieu, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Mar, 28, 2002. 
12
 See Daniel Medwed, The Zeal Deal:  Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction 
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004) (“While district attorneys must 
consider the costs of prosecuting crimes – because they largely use county funds in 
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As a result, what is left is a senseless political system with 
respect to criminal justice priorities.  Theoretically, governors, state 
legislatures, mayors and city councils, as the elected chief executives 
and legislative branches of government ought to be making policy 
decisions with respect to criminal justice. These individuals should 
also be prioritizing resource allocations so that spending on 
prosecuting crime and imprisoning people is placed in proper 
perspective and relation to other community needs such as housing, 
jobs, education, health, water, or sanitation.  But that is not what 
actually takes place.   
Chief prosecutors and sheriffs, with their electoral clout, 
supported by virtually wholly owned vested interests, and with the 
ultimate trump card of non-term limited virtual lifetime positions, 
exercise vastly disproportionate power to direct inordinate resources 
towards prosecuting and punishing crime.  Imagine a state with 50 or 
60 counties, each with their own locally elected sheriff and chief 
prosecutor who has been there for more than a decade, perhaps several 
decades.  These longtime sheriffs and chief prosecutors have 
organized themselves into statewide sheriffs’ and District Attorneys’ 
“Associations.”  These associations form powerful lobbies for 
legislation.  But equally, pity the poor politician running for governor 
in such a state with each of these 50 or 60 sheriffs and prosecutors, in 
close contact with their local communities after years or decades in 
office, against or without the support of these powerful, experienced 
political players.  It is difficult to find or even imagine a candidate 
who could prevail.  The same is true for those running for office as 
state legislators, mayors and local city councilmembers.  As a result, 
candidates for “policymaking” offices, such as chief executive or 
legislator, are often captive to what ostensibly are, and should be, non-
                                                                                                                                         
managing their offices – they need not overly concern themselves with the costs of 
incarceration given that, in the majority of jurisdictions, the prison system operates 
via state monies.  This ‘split-funding’ of the criminal justice system results in both 
the diffusion of the financial burden between the states and local budgets and, in 
political terms for prosecutors, the evasion of wholesale blame for the expenditures 
required in seeking convictions and procuring severe sentences.”). 
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policymaking elected officials in the form of local sheriffs and chief 
prosecutors who are benefited and empowered by mass incarceration.  
 
IV.  TODAY’S SOLUTION TIES HISTORICAL GOALS TO REALITY 
 
Today, local governments are quite well developed. In contrast 
to the first half of the 19th century, most Americans live in urban 
areas, not rural. Cities and towns have developed local government 
structures, similar to the federal and state models, with a chief 
executive, usually a mayor, and a legislative branch such as a city or 
town council.  The same is true at the county level with the 
development of county presidents and county boards.  Accordingly, in 
today’s day and age, it is no longer true that the only practical option 
for imparting or maintaining local control over chief prosecutors’ 
offices and sheriffs’ departments is the local election.   
Unlike the early 19th century, it is now perfectly plausible and 
practical to have local chief prosecutors and local sheriffs appointed in 
the same manner as almost all high federal government officials and 
many high state level officials – appointment by the local chief 
executive (be it city mayor or county president) with advice and 
consent of a local legislative body (be it city or town council or county 
board). This would be a better compromise between the appointment 
system at the remote state level of governor or state legislature that 
initially existed at the start of the 19th century, and the local election 
system that we now have. The local election system has led us down 
the path of incarceration as a solution to many problems, such as 
mental health, substance abuse, lack of jobs, education, and poverty, 
resulting in our current system of mass incarceration.   
Appointing sheriffs and chief prosecutors would have a 
number of salutary effects.  First, it would place what should be non-
policymaking positions under the control and authority of those who 
rightfully ought to be elected – those in policymaking positions such 
as the chief executives and legislators.  In this way, the position of 
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sheriff and chief prosecutor would be charged with carrying out the 
policies of the elected policymakers, which is as it should be.   
Second, appointing sheriffs and chief prosecutors would more 
likely ensure that the priority ranking of prosecution and punishment 
within the broad array of services the government is expected to 
deliver is aligned with that of the elected policymakers, and therefore 
more closely aligned with the wishes and priorities of the electorate, 
and more responsive to it.  It is much easier and more likely for a chief 
executive such as a mayor, or a legislator such as a city 
councilmember, to be voted out of office than a sheriff or chief 
prosecutor.  And in an appointment system, voting out the appointer 
ends the appointment.  Additionally, the existence of term limits for 
the chief executive ensures that sheriffs and chief prosecutors, with 
their virtually unchecked authority within their sphere, would not be in 
place for decades, as is now the case, with the attendant 
aggrandizement of power over time. Finally, appointing chief 
prosecutors and sheriffs would place the positions one step removed 
from direct electoral politics. This would significantly reduce the ill 
effects of vested interests such as employees, their family and friends 
and the letting of contracts. 
All of the above would lead to less emphasis and resources on 
incarceration as a solution to societal problems, and put the 
prosecution of crime and its punishment more in its proper perspective 
and balance with other community needs and alternative solutions.  It 
will also significantly reduce the entrenched political opposition to 
ending mass incarceration that impedes reform.  There are those who 
say a return to appointments is politically infeasible.
13
 To the contrary, 
just as elections swept in to replace appointments in the hope of 
increased democracy and local control, an informed citizenry today 
would see that democracy and local control requires taking those 
outsized political offices and placing them back into the hands of the 
properly responsive elected official, and this time a truly local one. 
                                                          
13
 Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, supra note 3; Medwed, supra note 12. 
